making and intemation influence in terms of decision theory has been made recently by several political scientists, including Singer (1963) , Glenn Snyder (1960) , and Russett (1963) . In fact, theoretical analysis in the language of decision theory seems increasingly widespread among political scientists and other social scientists concerned with international affairs. This paper discusses a number of difficulties in the use of decision theory for actual research on national decision-making.
It also discusses a modification of the decision-theory approach which may make easier the actual measurement of theoretical variables relevant to decision-making.1- In the abstract, the combined judgments which the influencee makes along both of these dimensions will determine his contingent expectations and thus his response to the influence attempt [1963, p. (Singer, 1963, pp. 428-30) . Glenn Snyder also acknowledges that national decision-makers may act &dquo;irrationally,&dquo; noting that: &dquo;Irrationality may take the form either of failing to act in accordance with one's best estimate of costs, gains, and probabilities, or of faulty calculation of these factors in the light of the evidence available&dquo; (G. Snyder, 1960, p. 174) . (Deutsch, 1961, p. 64 (Atkinson, 1957 (Atkinson, , 1958 in support of the proposition that: Aroused motive to perform act X = f ( Motivational disposition X Incentive X Expectancy)
Motivational disposition represents a relatively permanent disposition (personality trait) to value incentives (rewards or punishments) of a certain kind.
Incentive is the magnitude of the specific reward or potential satisfaction offered should the expected consequence of act X occur. Incentives vary in the extent to which they satisfy a particular motivational disposition.
Expectancy is indicated by the probability that the performance of act X will have a certain consequence.
(In his most recent work, Atkinson [1964, p. 
